Is it possible for staff who have long been described as volunteers, to be workers in practice? On 14 January 2026, the Court of Appeal answered this question, in relation to the engagement of volunteer coastguards, with an emphatic “yes”; in the case of Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom [2026] EWCA Civ 6.

The decision has significant implications for organisations, particularly charities, that remunerate volunteers for at least some of their activities – a well-intentioned practice, but one that can very easily tip individuals from volunteer to worker status, which in turn brings with it greater legal obligations and liability for organisations.

What happened in Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom?

Martin Groom was a Coastguard Rescue Officer (“CRO”), a role he performed for the Maritime Coastguard Agency (“MCA”). The CRO role was expressly described as voluntary in the applicable Volunteer Handbook and Code of Conduct. As a CRO, Mr Groom would receive callouts from the MCA when CRO support was required. He was not required to respond to any callout, or to perform his role at any specific times or for any amount of time. However, if he did attend a callout, Mr Groom was obliged to comply with the MCA’s reasonable instructions and was entitled (though not compelled) to claim remuneration for expenses incurred and the time he spent on certain activities.

In 2020, Mr Groom’s position as a CRO was terminated by the MCA. He appealed that decision, and claimed the right to be accompanied to the appeal hearing by a member of his trade union. The MCA denied that he had that right, which ordinarily attaches only to employees and workers. Mr Groom brought a claim alleging that he was, in fact, a worker.

The dispute in this case centred on whether Mr Groom had “entered or works under” a contract to perform work or services, within the meaning of s.230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, in his role as a CRO.

What did the tribunals decide?

The Employment Tribunal (“ET”) found that Mr Groom was not a worker, because there was no contractual relationship between him and the MCA. The ET relied on four particular factors in reaching this conclusion:

  • the applicable agreement was described as voluntary;
  • there was no “automatic” remuneration, many CROs did not claim it, and for some activities there was no remuneration available;
  • the degree of control exercised by the MCA was not particularly significant; and
  • an HMRC investigation had concluded that CROs were not workers.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) overturned that decision, concluding that a contract was formed, and that Mr Groom was a worker, each time he attended an activity in respect of which he was entitled to remuneration. The EAT reasoned that:

  • the description of the relationship as voluntary was relevant but in no way conclusive;
  • the need to “claim” remuneration (rather than it being automatically granted), and the fact many CROs did not do so, could not affect the essential fact that CROs were entitled to remuneration for most activities undertaken; and
  • given the requirements of the Code of Conduct, it was doubtful whether a CRO could leave an activity after commencing it.

What did the Court of Appeal decide?

The Court of Appeal (“CA”) upheld the EAT’s decision: a contract was formed, and Mr Groom was a worker, each time he attended an activity in respect of which he was entitled to remuneration. It made the following important points:

  1. It was not necessary to identify an “umbrella” contract that had continuing effect between call-outs for there to be a contract formed in respect of the periods in which a CRO attended an activity for which they were entitled to be remunerated.
  2. Equally, it is no bar to worker status that an individual is not obliged to attend work at a particular time, or for particular (or minimum) hours.
  3. When a CRO had attended for work for which they were entitled to compensation, there was mutuality of obligation: the CRO had to comply with the MCA’s reasonable instructions whilst on duty, and the MCA had to make payment to the CRO on receipt of a claim for remuneration.
  4. The MCA compensated CROs on an hourly basis for their time, an arrangement which the CA described as “the essence of remuneration”. This was a classic “wage/work bargain”.
  5. There was a clear intention to create legal relations. The MCA’s payments were remunerative, and a CRO could bring a claim to recover any such payments withheld by the MCA.

Key takeaways for organisations

The CA decision has significant implications for organisations that rely on volunteers, particularly where volunteers are entitled to receive remuneration for any part of the work that they do. Such volunteers may in fact be workers, a status which attracts a whole raft of statutory employment rights – including to minimum wage, paid holiday and rest breaks, and protections from discrimination and for whistleblowing – as well as income tax and National Insurance contribution liability.

The following key points should be considered carefully by charitable organisations where volunteers are engaged.

  1. A right to remuneration will point toward worker status. A crucial factor in this case was that the CROs had a right to compensation for the time they spent on certain activities for the MCA (above and beyond reimbursement of expenses), even if they did not exercise that right. This was one of the factors (amongst others) that pointed towards worker status. This is a consistent theme in employment status cases such as this: a right to remuneration (even if modest, or occasional) will point towards worker status, whereas a lack of remuneration (other than being able to claim actual or reasonably pre-estimated out of pocket expenses) will point towards volunteer status. Charities should therefore give very careful consideration to the approach they take here, and understand that the giving of any sort of remuneration to volunteers, above and beyond reimbursement of expenses, may result in those individuals being or becoming workers in practice.
  2. As will mutuality of obligation and a high degree of control. Although there was no obligation on the MCA to provide (or any CRO to accept) any future work, for the period that a CRO reported to do remunerated work, each party owed the other obligations. The MCA owed the CRO payment for their time, and the CRO owed the MCA an obligation to comply with the MCA’s reasonable instructions in the work. The CA found that this supported a contractual relationship. Given the safety-related nature of the CRO role, it is unsurprising that the MCA required CROs to comply with its instructions during call-outs, but this also indicated a degree of control over how the role was performed was consistent with worker status. Charities should consider the extent to which a mutuality of obligations may arise – even temporarily – in parts of the role performed by their volunteers, and seek legal advice if they are concerned.
  3. Labels regarding employment status are not determinative. Whether a contract exists, and whether it is a worker contract, is analysed based on the real, substantive nature of the relationship between the parties; not the label given to the arrangement by the parties involved (whether in documentation or otherwise). Charities cannot rely on labelling individuals as volunteers (even with their express agreement that they are such) as determining legal employment status; particularly where the reality of the working relationship is more akin to that of worker.
  4. Volunteers may also (and occasionally) be workers. As this case shows, it is entirely possible for an individual to be a volunteer when doing certain activities, and a worker when doing others, for the same organisation. This may be because there is, in practice, an overarching “umbrella” contract that applies to certain activities but not others (though this does not necessarily have to be the case). It is also possible for there to be a series of discrete worker contracts which arise in relation to specific activities, but not others. Either way, charities should carefully consider the full range of activities their volunteers undertake, and the terms that apply to those individuals in respect of each activity, in order to ensure that employment status (or lack thereof) is clear.
  5. Liability can be significant; pro-actively seek legal advice to understand risks. The potential liabilities associated with unrecognised worker status for a group of volunteers are significant. This is not just in terms of latent employment rights (such as entitlement to National Minimum Wage and holiday pay), but also in terms of latent tax liability (for income tax and National Insurance contributions), and possibly reputational damage. If charities are concerned that this might be the case – particularly if volunteers receive remuneration or compensation of some kind – seeking specific legal advice as soon as possible, and before the issue is raised by a volunteer, will significantly increase their ability to manage the legal risks.

The material in this article is provided for guidance and general information only and is not intended to constitute legal or other professional advice upon which you should rely. In particular, the information should not be used as a substitute for a full and proper consultation with a suitably qualified professional. Please do contact the Bates Wells team if you require further information.