Transgender pool player loses gender reassignment discrimination claim in first application of For Women Scotland judgment

On 1 August 2025, the Canterbury County Court reached its decision in the case of Harriet Haynes v The English Blackball Pool Federation; finding that Ms Haynes (a transgender woman with a Gender Recognition Certificate (“GRC”), who plays pool at county level) had not been discriminated against on grounds of gender reassignment by the English Blackball Pool Federation, when it took the decision to exclude transgender women from the female player category in its competitive pool tournaments.

The Court found that Ms Haynes’ exclusion was not because of her gender reassignment, but rather because of her sex (i.e. the fact that she is biologically male); her claim of gender reassignment discrimination therefore failed. The Court also went on to confirm that, even if Ms Haynes had brought a sex discrimination claim, that too would have been unsuccessful, on the basis that pool is a “gender affected activity” which can lawfully be organised into separate competitions for men and women, in order to ensure “fair competition” (in accordance with section 195 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EA”)). In this instance, the approach of excluding biological men from the female player category was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of fairness of competition, and was not therefore discriminatory on grounds of sex.

Though this is only a first instance decision, and one involving participation in sport rather than employment, it is the first to touch on the issue of gender reassignment discrimination in the wake of the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in For Women Scotland v The Scottish Ministers (“FWS“), and is therefore worth bearing in mind. We explore the judgment in more detail below.

What were the facts in the Haynes v The English Blackball Pool Federation case?

Ms Haynes is an expert player of English eight-ball pool; having played, and won competitions, at county level. She is also a transgender woman, with a GRC.

The English Blackball Pool Federation (“EBPF”) is a not-for-profit unincorporated association, and one of the two main organisations which organise pool competitions in England. EBPF county competitions include a competition for women only teams, and Ms Haynes played for the EBPF’s Kent County Women’s A Team.

In 2023, the EBPF announced a change in its rules, so that only people who were born female would be permitted to play in its female competitions and teams. As a result, Ms Haynes was forced to stop playing for the EBPF Kent County Women’s A Team.

Ms Haynes consequently brought a claim for direct gender reassignment discrimination against the EBPF. She claimed that she had “had her identity of playing pool in the female category taken from her”, had suffered distress and upset, and had been subjected to numerous hurtful remarks on social media, all as a result of the EBPF’s rule change.

What was the County Court’s decision?

The Court held that Ms Haynes’ exclusion was not because of her gender reassignment, but rather because of her sex (specifically, the fact that she is biologically male). Her claim of gender reassignment discrimination therefore failed.

In reaching this decision, the Court found that:

• The Supreme Court in FWS determined that references in the EA to “woman” meant “biological woman”, and did not include transgender women (even those in possession of a GRC). Similarly, references to “sex” meant “biological sex”. Ms Haynes, for the purposes of the EA (and her discrimination claim), was therefore biologically male, but with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.
• The EBPF had excluded Ms Haynes from women’s competitions “because she is a biological male”. It could not be said that they had instead, or additionally, excluded her because of gender reassignment. The EBPF treated Ms Haynes as a man (and therefore ineligible for the women’s competition) “because they have not accepted that her gender reassignment certificate requires her to be treated as a woman for the purposes of the EA 2010. The Claimant is aggrieved by that. But the Defendants’ view is in accordance with the law as stated in FWS. Taking that view and acting on it cannot amount to unlawful discrimination on grounds of gender reassignment.”
• The Supreme Court in FWS had said, at paragraph 134 of its judgment, that “where gender reassignment is the protected characteristic, in the case of a male person proposing to or undergoing gender reassignment to the opposite sex, the correct comparator is likely to be a man without the protected characteristic of gender reassignment and similarly for a woman (although there may be situations where the comparator’s sex is immaterial to the comparison).”
• On the question of the correct comparator in this case: “(i) there must be no material difference between the circumstances of the Claimant and the comparator, (ii) differences of sex are a material difference (as the Claimant’s submissions implicitly recognise), (iii) the comparator in this case must therefore be of the same sex as the Claimant, and (iv) FWS requires [the Court] to find that for the purposes of EA 2010 the Claimant’s sex is male.”

The Judge concluded that there was no basis, consistent with FWS, on which Ms Haynes’ claim could succeed.

The Court was, however, careful to emphasise that its findings did not undermine the protection from discrimination afforded to transgender people on the basis of their gender reassignment; clearly stating that those protections remain robust in other, broader, contexts.

Ms Haynes additionally sought to argue that, if the Court were to follow FWS in its judgment, this would be a breach of her rights under Articles 8 (right to private and family life) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), and that there should be a declaration that FWS was incompatible with the ECHR. However, the Court stated that it was bound to follow FWS (as the latter was a Supreme Court authority) and could not see any way to distinguish it, and that it considered it “extremely unlikely that any higher court would grant the declaration of incompatibility which the Claimant now wishes to seek”.

The Court also highlighted that the FWS judgment did not undermine the legal recognition of, and protection from discrimination of, transgender people more generally; and that the issues to be determined in Ms Haynes’ case were very narrow (specifically that she felt that her identity of playing pool in the female category had been taken from her).

The Court also went on to confirm that, even if Ms Haynes had brought a sex discrimination claim, that too would have been unsuccessful, on the basis that pool is a “gender affected activity” which can lawfully be organised into separate competitions for men and women, in order to ensure “fair competition” (in accordance with section 195 of the EA). In this instance, the approach of excluding biological men from the female player category was not discriminatory on grounds of sex, as it was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of fairness of competition.

Key takeaways

The judgment in Haynes is the first to apply the Supreme Court’s findings in FWS – confirming that “sex” is to be interpreted as “biological sex” (i.e. an individual’s sex at birth) for the purposes of the EA, irrespective of whether an individual identifies with and/or has subsequently obtained a GRC for the opposite sex.

It also highlights that allegations of direct discrimination which arise as a result of single-sex services and spaces (which are based on biological sex), will likely fall to be dealt with as issues of potential direct sex discrimination, rather than as issues of potential direct gender reassignment discrimination. That does not, however, preclude transgender individuals from bringing claims for harassment relating to gender reassignment in relation to such services and spaces – and such a claim may be more likely to succeed.

It is, however, important to bear in mind that the Haynes judgment is very fact and sector specific. As the Court itself was at pains to point out, it “will have no bearing on most types of gender reassignment discrimination claim. It will not, for example, imply that a trans person who is dismissed from their job because of their gender reassignment cannot claim for direct discrimination. As a further example, relating to sport [FWS] illustrates a situation where a gender reassignment discrimination claim would succeed if exclusion could not be justified under section 195(2) of EA 2010 [as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim]”.

If you are interested in the wider implications of the FWS judgment on the world of sport, check out our article here. If you would like to learn more about the background of the FWS case, you can find out more here. Get in touch with Paul Jennings if you would like to discuss anything above further.

The material in this article is provided for guidance and general information only and is not intended to constitute legal or other professional advice upon which you should rely. In particular, the information should not be used as a substitute for a full and proper consultation with a suitably qualified professional. Please do contact the Bates Wells team if you require further information.