Reproduced with permission of Thomas Reuters, a version of this article was published on Practical Law.

  • Court confirms strict 21 day time limit for presenting petition challenging election result
  • Time runs from day of election which is the day of polling – not necessarily when the result is formally declared
  • The case is a strong reminder to be wary of AI “hallucinations”

As the local elections this May drew to a close, those watching the count in one district of Worcestershire witnessed a highly unusual political spectacle: the choosing of a winning candidate by lot following an exact tie. The tied candidates represented two of the night’s biggest winners nationally: Hannah Robson of the Green Party of England and Wales, and Liz Williams of Reform UK. After several recounts, one ballot for each candidate was placed in a ballot box and one for Ms Robson was drawn from it at random. Recently, Liz Williams petitioned the Court to overturn the Green Party’s victory – but at a hearing in the Royal Courts of Justice, the Divisional Court dismissed her petition and ordered her to pay her opponent’s legal costs.

The petition

Ms Williams’ petition challenged the result of the election, which resulted in Ms Robson becoming county councillor for the Littletons division of the district of Wychavon, on several different grounds. In particular, she raised objections both to the manner in which the tiebreak ballot draw was carried out and to the campaigning methods of the Green Party on polling day. The petition named as respondents both Ms Robson, as the successful candidate, and Victor Allison and Meesha Patel, the deputy returning officers responsible for administering the count. Two further respondents were removed from the petition at an early-stage hearing. Bates Wells acted for Ms Robson.

The application

A hearing took place on 17 October 2025 to consider an application to strike Ms Willaims’ petition out before a full trial on the basis that Ms Williams’ petition had been issued at court too late, contrary to the strict time limits set out in the Representation of the People Act 1983 (‘RPA’). Put simply, the application argued that:

  • Section 129 of the RPA demands that an election petition must be presented within 21 days after the day on which the election was held.
  • By section 37 of the RPA, the day of election for local councillors is the first Thursday in May. In 2025, this was 1 May 2025.
  • That meant that Ms Williams had to present her petition by the end of the twenty-first day after 1 May 2025: that is, by the end of 22 May 2025. Ms Williams did not present her petition until 23 May 2025, meaning it was out of time.
  • Since the RPA makes no provision for extensions to the strict deadline, the court was required to strike the petition out.

In written submissions, and in oral submissions made by Ms Williams in person at the hearing, she argued that the day on which the election was held should be treated not as being the polling day, but instead as being the day on which the count was completed and the result announced. Because this did not happen until 2 May 2025, this would have meant her petition was brought in time.

In support of this argument, Ms Williams relied upon the case of R v Hackney ex parte Sidebotham [1912] 3 KB 113. None of the lawyers representing the respondents to the petition were able to locate the case. Giving judgment, Mr Justice Martin Spencer concluded that the case “does not exist”, and may have been “an invention, indeed an hallucination, by artificial intelligence”.

In the alternative, Ms Williams suggested that a flexible approach should be taken to time limits and directions in electoral petitions, especially given the public interest in the complaints she had raised not being stifled by a procedural time limit.

The judgment

In a judgment with which Mrs Justice Hill agreed, Mr Justice Martin Spencer concluded that the respondents’ arguments on time limits had been correct. Adopting the petitioner’s arguments about the date of the election for purposes of calculating time would undermine the clear intention of Parliament to treat polling day as the date the election was held. It would also be contrary to the ordinary and natural meaning of the word “held” in this context. The petition had therefore been due to be presented by the end of 22 May 2025, and by presenting it only on 23 May 2025 Ms Williams had brought it out of time.

As the time limit in this case was laid down by primary legislation, Mr Justice Martin Spencer considered that the court had no jurisdiction to vary or extend it. The petition was therefore dismissed.

Unlike the recent case of Moore v Royal Mail Group Ltd [2025] EWHC 2320 (KB), in which the Divisional Court noted the public interest in ensuring that petitions raising potentially important questions about elections are not defeated by technicalities more restrictive than necessary to achieve certainty, this case did not concern mere service requirements: rather, it concerned the presentation of a petition in line with a time limit in primary legislation which the court had no power to change. 

Comment  

This interesting and unusual case serves as a reminder of the strictness of the time limit for bringing election petitions under the RPA, and confirms that the delays to a count caused by recounts and the other twists and turns of the electoral process will not serve to lengthen the deadline.

The case also provides another timely warning, if further warnings were needed, of the dangers of relying on the assistance of generative AI in preparing legal submissions, given the unfortunate tendency of some such programmes to invent or “hallucinate” case law.

Bates Wells’ team is ranked Band 1 by legal directory Chambers UK for Electoral law. The team is well-placed to assist both candidates and returning officers in responding to election petitions. Should you require assistance with an actual or threatened petition, or with any other election law issues, please do get in touch.